http://www.informationweek.com/news/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=199905838&pgno=2&queryText=
As I've mentioned many times before, computer security is taken too lightly by too many people. I hope the CIO of DHS doesn't think that way.
First off, we need a CISO *and* a CIO for an organization as complex and as bureaucratic as the DHS. The CIO and CISO should get together to formulate a strategy that will feed the needs of the IT dept (CIO) and balance it or temper it with the security ramifications that come with the needs (CIOSO).
My worry is that while Congress battles the powerful bureaucrats and while the bureaucrats expend energy in defending themselves, the door is left wide open for everyone to do what they want to do. In other words, the utter indifference to real security is what results in trojans, viruses, inappropriate and objectionable content invading the computers.
Another concern is that the computers are allowed to access the Internet! First off, you want to very severely restrict access to the 'Net, and if you must, make sure you have powerful tools to control both access as well as downloads.
Here's what a basic, 20-point policy would look like (for user-terminals/computers at least):
1. Disable floppy drives (or buy computers without them)
2. Disable CD drive (need special code to unlock and use - content to be disclosed first)
3. Disable USB drives
4. Disable any and all controls on the OS that will permit configuration changes (such as IE security level etc)
5. Disable all downloads from the 'Net (incl HTTP/FTP)
6. Disable all uploads to ANY location
7. Internal data transfer should happen through pre-mapped, controlled, and constantly-monitored, network drives - probabaly a departmentalized storage subsystem such as NetApp Filers or EMC CLARiiON etc
8. Use encryption as much as possible, both on disk as well as on the network
9. Use forced authentication at every entry point (no trusted hosts nonsense)
10. Disable installation of any kind of unauthorized programs
11. Use at least 2-factor authentication (password + random key as an example)
12. Go for biometric authentication whenever and wherever possible
13. Use AV software extensively, ensuring prompt and forced updates and reboots as needed
14. Use IDS (pref IPS also) software at every sensitive node
15. Control, monitor, and record ALL communication - IM, email, phone etc
16. Email clients should be tuned to only send mail to internal personnel - no external addresses should be allowed - EVER
17. Scan ALL incoming packets - and outgoing packets at sensitive nodes
18. NO ATTACHMENTS ALLOWED ANYTIME - email/IM - whatever mode of communication
19. Use hardware encryption devices and encrypt all data, everywhere. Use PKI devices to manage the keys
20. Finally, EDUCATE THE EMPLOYEES. Nothing works better than education
Watch this space for more ideas that DHS will probably never implement! Next I'll be focusing on actual employee monitoring details.
Be safe!
Showing posts with label network security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label network security. Show all posts
Friday, June 22, 2007
Monday, May 28, 2007
FBI Security
...or the lack of it, really, at least according to a GAO report that was on the news a couple of days ago.
Problems included lack of encryption (for sensitive data), improper or missing authentication and authorization of users before they accessed sensitive information, and improper or default configuration of network devices.
Usually, network devices come with a default password that's a pain to change because each piece of hardware has a different management interface. Let's say you have five network devices - two switches (from different vendors), a router, a bridge, and a gateway.
Each device will have a unique website, a different way to set passwords, and a different way they can be accessed. The point is that a lack of common management interface leads to some very lazy administrators.
Here's my recommendation:
All you network hardware vendors -- can't you work together to create A SINGLE interface that could be used to work with the multitude of devices!?
It'd make life a million times easier for everyone, and make the environment a lot safer. I'm not about to go into the details of what such an interface should have, and would entail, but maybe later.
For now, this is what the FBI should do:
a. Follow a proper process that would track every piece of hardware from cradle to grave
b. Make people responsible and accountable for changing passwords every 2 months (or as often as needed per the security policy)
c. Make sure the results of the password change are updated in a document that lists those devices that could not be modified (maybe they're getting serviced, or were down for some reason), and get to them ASAP
d. Provide a checklist to any manager that has people reporting to him, on whether his employees (and he himself) actually needs access to any sensitive data. Be harsh and do not be afraid of treading on egos - do what is important and necessary to keep the country safe. People who mind on the basis of ego are eminently dispensable, and could prove dangerous in their efforts to satisfy their power-hungry needs
e. Every vendor that supplies to the FBI MUST supply a password that is tough to crack (the default password should satisfy existing requirements) - maybe not ALL criteria should be revealed to the vendor, but a few, such as the length, inclusion of special characters, etc should be mandatory
f. Use a password management software to make sure these devices are in compliance at all times (as opposed to 'b') if resistance from people is high
g. All changes should go through Change Management control and sign-off must be received from the proper authorities before changes are implemented
h. Audit the entire organization every 6 months - this may seem too frequent, but it's completely worth the time and effort. After the first 3-4 audits, the time and effort required for each subsequent audit should reduce as long as compliance rules are being properly followed
i. DO NOT make exceptions at any stage - as the cliche goes: a chain is only as strong as its weakest link
j. The default access for any device in its original, default configuration should be DENY_ALL, and then it can be configured to selectively permit traffic and users
k. Use RBACs and ACLs to control, limit, and deny access
l. Use strong and detailed logging at all levels. Storage is cheap - lives are not
Be safe!
Problems included lack of encryption (for sensitive data), improper or missing authentication and authorization of users before they accessed sensitive information, and improper or default configuration of network devices.
Usually, network devices come with a default password that's a pain to change because each piece of hardware has a different management interface. Let's say you have five network devices - two switches (from different vendors), a router, a bridge, and a gateway.
Each device will have a unique website, a different way to set passwords, and a different way they can be accessed. The point is that a lack of common management interface leads to some very lazy administrators.
Here's my recommendation:
All you network hardware vendors -- can't you work together to create A SINGLE interface that could be used to work with the multitude of devices!?
It'd make life a million times easier for everyone, and make the environment a lot safer. I'm not about to go into the details of what such an interface should have, and would entail, but maybe later.
For now, this is what the FBI should do:
a. Follow a proper process that would track every piece of hardware from cradle to grave
b. Make people responsible and accountable for changing passwords every 2 months (or as often as needed per the security policy)
c. Make sure the results of the password change are updated in a document that lists those devices that could not be modified (maybe they're getting serviced, or were down for some reason), and get to them ASAP
d. Provide a checklist to any manager that has people reporting to him, on whether his employees (and he himself) actually needs access to any sensitive data. Be harsh and do not be afraid of treading on egos - do what is important and necessary to keep the country safe. People who mind on the basis of ego are eminently dispensable, and could prove dangerous in their efforts to satisfy their power-hungry needs
e. Every vendor that supplies to the FBI MUST supply a password that is tough to crack (the default password should satisfy existing requirements) - maybe not ALL criteria should be revealed to the vendor, but a few, such as the length, inclusion of special characters, etc should be mandatory
f. Use a password management software to make sure these devices are in compliance at all times (as opposed to 'b') if resistance from people is high
g. All changes should go through Change Management control and sign-off must be received from the proper authorities before changes are implemented
h. Audit the entire organization every 6 months - this may seem too frequent, but it's completely worth the time and effort. After the first 3-4 audits, the time and effort required for each subsequent audit should reduce as long as compliance rules are being properly followed
i. DO NOT make exceptions at any stage - as the cliche goes: a chain is only as strong as its weakest link
j. The default access for any device in its original, default configuration should be DENY_ALL, and then it can be configured to selectively permit traffic and users
k. Use RBACs and ACLs to control, limit, and deny access
l. Use strong and detailed logging at all levels. Storage is cheap - lives are not
Be safe!
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